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ABSTRACT
In a companion paper, we proposed that
cognitive debiasing is a skill essential in
developing sound clinical reasoning to mitigate
the incidence of diagnostic failure. We reviewed
the origins of cognitive biases and some
proposed mechanisms for how debiasing
processes might work. In this paper, we first
outline a general schema of how cognitive
change occurs and the constraints that may
apply. We review a variety of individual factors,
many of them biases themselves, which may be
impediments to change. We then examine the
major strategies that have been developed in the
social sciences and in medicine to achieve
cognitive and affective debiasing, including the
important concept of forcing functions. The
abundance and rich variety of approaches that
exist in the literature and in individual clinical
domains illustrate the difficulties inherent in
achieving cognitive change, and also the need
for such interventions. Ongoing cognitive
debiasing is arguably the most important feature
of the critical thinker and the well-calibrated
mind. We outline three groups of suggested
interventions going forward: educational
strategies, workplace strategies and forcing
functions. We stress the importance of ambient
and contextual influences on the quality of
individual decision making and the need to
address factors known to impair calibration of
the decision maker. We also emphasise the
importance of introducing these concepts and
corollary development of training in critical
thinking in the undergraduate level in medical
education.
INTRODUCTION
In the first of these two papers, we sug-
gested that cognitive debiasing is an
essential skill in developing sound clinical
reasoning. We reviewed the origins of
innate and acquired cognitive biases and
some proposed mechanisms for how
debiasing processes might work.1 In this
paper, we first examine some barriers to
debiasing and then review multiple strat-
egies to address them.
Over the years, various strategies have
been adopted to deal with shortcomings
and failures in decision making. As early
as 1772, Ben Johnson outlined a ‘moral
algebra’ to improve his judgements and
avoid rash decisions.2 Proverbs, aphor-
isms, caveats, mnemonics, lists and many
other strategies have emerged that serve a
similar purpose. Investigations on their
effectiveness have not been so frequent
and, presently, cognitive debiasing is an
inexact science. Here, we offer a variety
of strategies from both behavioural
sciences and medicine that have been
developed in recent years, which vary
from experimental studies to simple
observations to opinions, with varying
levels of evidentiary support. Our
purpose has been to develop an inclusive
collection of strategies in a framework
for learners, researchers and educators
that will provide a practical scaffold for
the work ahead.
Cognitive debiasing involves changes
that rarely come about through a discrete,
single event but instead through a succes-
sion of stages—from a state of lack of
awareness of bias, to awareness, to the
ability to detect bias, to considering a
change, to deciding to change, then initi-
ating strategies to accomplish change, and
finally, maintaining the change. These key
steps are outlined in figure 1,3 which may
help our understanding of how physi-
cians might engage in debiasing. Several
caveats need to be applied to this model:
first, a clinician making a biased response
does not necessarily mean that the deci-
sion maker was unaware of correct
approaches to make decisions4; second,
for biases to be successfully addressed,
there needs to be such awareness as well
as the motivation for change; third, the
clinician needs to be aware of the direc-
tion in which the bias is taking him or
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her and its magnitude; and finally, even if the clinician
is aware of a potential for bias in a particular situ-
ation, he or she might still be unable to shake the con-
viction of his or her biased judgement.5
Many clinicians presently appear to be at the pre-
contemplative level. They may be unaware of the
powerful influence of unconscious factors on their
reasoning, may not realise that cognitive and affective
biases can affect their decision making, and therefore,
see no reason to take any action to change their think-
ing. Introducing these ideas and raising awareness is a
prerequisite for debiasing. Sometimes a sentinel event
can catalyse the uptake of an important idea such as
the publication of Groopman’s book How Doctors
Think.6 Conventional forms of information exchange,
such as rounds, seminars, and morbidity and mortality
conferences, may provide opportunities to address
cognitive pitfalls within the context of engaging case
examples. At times, however, a single experience,
which can be shared in such moments, can change
thinking. This happens especially if the event is emo-
tionally laden because we tend to be particularly influ-
enced by emotionally arousing experiences.7 8 For
example, if a physician misdiagnoses a headache as
benign and the patient subsequently dies from a sub-
arachnoid haemorrhage, the powerful impact of this
experience might produce long-standing changes in
the physician’s approach towards the diagnosis of
patients presenting with headache.
Increasing physicians’ awareness of the need for
debiasing does not guarantee, however, that debiasing
actually occurs. Indeed, since Fischoff ’s pioneering
work,9 a general mood of gloom and doom towards
cognitive debiasing in the psychology and medical lit-
erature seems to have prevailed5 10; it is accepted to
be a difficult but not an impossible task. A variety of
factors may explain the intractability of cognitive bias
and why it is so difficult to change. In addition to
lack of awareness of the impact of bias in clinical rea-
soning, clinicians’ overconfidence in their own judge-
ments may be one of the most powerful factors
preventing debiasing.11 Even those physicians who are
aware of the potential impact of biases on clinical
judgement may not believe that they are vulnerable to
them. Moreover, it is a human tendency to bolster
existent beliefs rather than searching for new
approaches, and it is easier to stay with the status quo
rather than make efforts to learn new approaches and
change current practice. Physicians are not immune to
these tendencies. Finally, the invariably abstract, arid
form of the discussions of cognitive processes contri-
butes to these impediments: they typically lack the
vividness and concrete nature of clinical disease pre-
sentations that are more appealing to clinicians.
This becomes even more challenging if one considers
that biases tend to act unconsciously. A general
problem with debiasing, as Horton notes, is that ‘the
same kinds of biases that distort our thinking in
general also distort our thinking about the biases them-
selves’.8 Indeed, many biases are applied uncon-
sciously, and if physicians are unaware of them, they
will have difficulty recognising the need for debiasing.
Clinicians themselves may be just as vulnerable as their
patients to a number of psychological factors that
might compromise decision making.12 13 Nevertheless,
the topic has attracted considerable interest and effort,
reflecting a widespread perception of the need for
solutions to the vulnerability of human reasoning.14
STRATEGIES FOR COGNITIVE DEBIASING
In the first of these combined papers, we suggested that
debiasing would require a physician to detect the need
to override the initial intuitive responses to a problem in
order to engage in analytical processes to restructure
reasoning and find alternative solutions. The extent to
which a physician tends to engage—and succeed—in
debiasing depends not only on his/her prior knowledge
and experiences but also on thinking dispositions. Some
of the strategies described aim at making physicians
aware of the risk of biases, intervening during the con-
templation and preparation steps to enhance their
ability to detect the need for debiasing in the future; we
have grouped these under ‘educational strategies’ in
table 1. While educational strategies aim mostly to
enhance physicians’ ability to debiasing in the future,
other strategies may be implemented by the physician at
the time of problem-solving, while reasoning about the
problem at hand. These strategies have been grouped
under ‘workplace strategies’ in table 1 and include both
strategies that depend basically on physicians’ cognitive
processes and those that require interventions in the set-
tings of practice. Whereas some of these strategies have
been evaluated and some empirical evidence exists that
supports their use, others are supported mostly by
research in other domains; still others have a long-
standing tradition in clinical practice but have not
usually been subjected to formal investigation.
In table 2, we describe a number of strategies that are
collectively referred to as ‘forcing functions’. The
Figure 1 Transtheoretical model of change.
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Table 1 Educational and workplace strategies for cognitive debiasing
Strategy Comment Examples
Educational
training on theories of
reasoning and medical
decision making
Achieving improved diagnostic reasoning requires an understanding of cognitive
theories about decision making and the impact of cognitive biases15–18
▸ Educational curricula covering theories of decision making, major cognitive and affective
biases and their application to diagnostic reasoning19–21
Bias inoculation A key recommendation is to teach about cognitive and affective biases and develop
specific tools to test for them22–24 and for debiasing
▸ A ‘consider-the-opposite’ procedure marginally reduced anchoring in judgements of
personality traits25
▸ Cognitive forcing strategies to counteract cognitive bias showed minor effects26
Specific educational
interventions
Teaching specific skills may mitigate particular biases by providing basic knowledge
leading to greater insight
▸ People trained in inferential rules committed fewer base rate errors27 28
▸ Combining a non-analytical with an analytical approach in reading ECGs improved
diagnostic accuracy29
Cognitive tutoring systems Computer-based systems can be used to construct a learner’s profile of decision
making and provide feedback on specific biases and strategies to mitigate them
▸ Decision monitoring software of virtual slide cases detected cognitive biases according to
preset criteria30
Simulation training Simulation may be a venue for teaching about, identifying and remediating
cognitive errors31
▸ Residents experienced a simulation involving a difficult diagnosis with a cognitive error
trap32
Workplace
Get more information Heuristics and biases often arise in the context of insufficient information.
Diagnostic accuracy is related to thoroughness of cue acquisition33
▸ The greater the number of attributes of a problem that can be identified, the greater the
likelihood of selecting the best alternative34
Structured data acquisition Forcing deliberate data acquisition may avoid ‘spot diagnoses’ 35 36 by ensuring
that less obvious symptoms are considered
▸ Traditionally, data acquisition has been pursued by establishing a differential diagnosis
list, and more recently by employing a differential diagnosis checklist tool37
Affective debiasing Virtually all decision making involves some degree of affective influence. Many
affective biases are hard-wired. Decision makers often are unaware of the affective
influences on decision making38 39
▸ Overview of affective biases and recommendations for debiasing are available20
Metacognition, decoupling,
reflection, mindfulness
A deliberate disengagement or decoupling from intuitive judgements and
engagement in analytical processes to verify initial impressions1
▸ Deliberately reflecting upon initial diagnoses led to better diagnoses in difficult cases40
and counteracted availability bias41
Slowing down strategies Accuracy suffers when diagnoses are made too early and improves with slowing
down
▸ A planned time-out in the operating room42 43
Be more sceptical A tendency in human thinking is to believe rather than disbelieve. Type 1
processing occurs by viewing something as more predictable and coherent than is
really the case10 44
▸ No published examples
Recalibration When the decision maker anticipates additional risks, recalibration may reduce error ▸ When bias is anticipated, (eg, medical comorbidities in psychiatric patients),45 the
decision maker may recalibrate
Group decision strategy Seeking others’ opinions in complex situations may be of value. Crowd wisdom, at
times, is greater than an individual decision maker46
▸ Group rationality exceeded individual rationality in studies with experimental games in
other domains47
Personal accountability When people know their decisions will be scrutinised and they are accountable,
their performance may improve
▸ Participants who knew they would be justifying their responses performed better than
participants who thought that their responses were anonymous48
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degree of force can range from absolute constraints
such that an erroneous response cannot be made, for
example, removal of concentrated potassium solutions
from hospital wards, to explicit ‘if this then this’ rules,
to simply encouraging a desired response. Cognitive
forcing functions are rules that depend on the clinician
consciously applying a metacognitive step and cogni-
tively forcing a necessary consideration of alternatives.
Some of these functions can be easily recognised in clin-
ical adages or warnings that, although rarely investi-
gated, have long been part of clinical teaching. They do
not all need to be explicit; sometimes it is possible to
gently nudge people in a particular direction in order to
obtain better outcomes.68
These three groupings show considerable overlap
and are not intended to be seen as discrete but as a
spectrum. We have not included here in detail the
diverse initiatives in clinical research and practice that
fall under Cognitive Bias Mitigation (CBM). The
main purpose of CBM is to modify cognitive and
affective biases that underlie psychological dysfunc-
tion, associated mostly with anxiety and depression.69
Insofar as cognitive debiasing and CBM are both
directed at changing biased cognition and behaviour,
it would be expected that some CBM techniques
would be effective for those interested in debiasing
outside the psychiatric setting, especially for affective
bias.
PRESCRIPTIVE DEBIASING: ARE THERE SPECIFIC
COGNITIVE PILLS FOR COGNITIVE ILLS?
The different sources of bias might have implications
for the choice of strategies that can effectively coun-
teract them. While standard biases such as availability
and representativeness likely have an evolutionary
origin, that is, derive from heuristics that were adap-
tive in ancient environments, other biases may be
acquired through individuals’ particular experiences.
Examples of the latter are emotional dispositions and
specific biases towards particular classes of patients,
for example, drug seekers, patients with psychiatric
comorbidity or the ‘frequent flyer’. These biases are
usually acquired unconsciously through simply being
in specific environments and passively taking cues
from others.
Given the differing aetiologies of bias, we might ask if
some are more robust, and therefore, more resistant to
change than others, and should there be different
approaches to debiasing them?70 Perhaps the hard-
wired ‘evolutionary’ biases would be the most resistant
to change and may need several different debiasing
strategies as well as multiple interventions. Major cul-
tural, sociocentric and other biases that have been estab-
lished through learning may be easier to change,
although it would be preferable that these biases not be
allowed to form in the first place. Good role modelling,
good teaching programmes and optimal learning envir-
onments will help minimise them.49 Locally acquiredTa
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and individualistic biases might be expected to be the
least intransigent and the most amenable to change.
Regardless of their origin, affective biases may need fun-
damentally different approaches from cognitive biases.
The recent literature is becoming more specific about
biases and their defining characteristics. Various taxo-
nomic strategies have been proposed,5 71–74 and future
work may predict which particular types of strategies
might work for certain classes of biases, as Arkes has
proposed.71 Readers interested in the process of tailor-
ing debiasing strategies to specific biases may find a suit-
able starting point in the taxonomies proposed in
Stanovich’s work75 or that by Wilson and Brekke.5
HOW DO WE GO FORWARD?
1. A major goal will be to identify the parameters of
change. How might the workplace be optimised to avoid
bias in the first place? Which interventions are appropri-
ate for which biases and for which group (students,
residents, practicing clinicians). What maintenance strat-
egies will be required, and for how long?
2. While this and its companion paper were being pre-
pared, a comprehensive narrative review listing 42 tested
interventions to mitigate cognitive errors has been pub-
lished.76 The effectiveness of interventions and strategies
for debiasing in clinical practice deserves most attention
as studies on their use have largely been conducted in
other domains.
3. Medical training has traditionally put an emphasis on
declarative knowledge (knowing what, or information-
based) rather than procedural knowledge (knowing how,
or application-based). While clinical adages aimed at pre-
venting cognitive pitfalls are a tradition in clinical teach-
ing, they are addressed occasionally and without a
theoretical basis. Recently, efforts have been made to
increase emphasis on procedural knowledge by building
critical thinking into the undergraduate curriculum.77
Not surprisingly, the ability to avoid bias is correlated
with critical thinking ability.78 79 Many of the processes
Table 2 Forcing functions
Forcing function Comment Examples
Statistical and clinical
prediction rules (SPRs
and CPRs)
Explicit SPRs and CPRs typically equal or exceed the
reliability of expert ‘intuitive’ judgement. Easy to use,
they address significant issues
▸ The superiority of SPRs and CPRs over clinical judgement
has been shown.56 Physicians demonstrate pretest
probability variability in specific diagnoses57
Cognitive forcing
strategies (CFSs)
CFSs are special cases of forcing functions that require
clinicians to internalise and apply the forcing function
deliberately. They represent a systematic change in
clinical practice. CFSs may range from universal to
generic to specific
▸ Training might be given to identify situations (cognitive
overloading, fatigue, sleep deprivation, others) that
promote the use of heuristics and biases leading to
decision errors. Clinical scenarios can be identified in
which particular biases are likely to occur 1and explicit
CFSs can be taught to mitigate them58
Standing rules May be used in certain clinical settings that require a
given diagnosis not be made unless other must-not-miss
diagnoses have been ruled out
▸ No published examples
General diagnostic rules
in clinical practice
Many diagnostic ‘rules’ are often passed to trainees that
are intended to prevent diagnostic error
▸ Specific tips to avoid diagnostic error59
Rule Out Worst-Case
Scenario (ROWS)
A simple but useful general strategy to avoid missing
important diagnoses
▸ No published examples
Checklists A standard in aviation and now incorporated into
medicine in intensive care units, surgery and in the
diagnostic process60
▸ Catheter-related bloodstream infections were sustainably
reduced by clinicians’ adopting five evidence-based
procedures on a checklist and reminders such as
reinforcing strategies61
▸ The implementation of a surgical safety checklist led to
reductions in death rates and complications in
non-cardiac surgery in a multicenter study62
Stopping rules Stopping rules are an important form of forcing
functions—they determine when enough information
has been gathered to make an optimal decision63 64
▸ No published examples
Consider the opposite Seeking evidence to support a decision opposite to your
initial impression may be a useful way of forcing
consideration of other options
▸ Experimental studies in psychological research have
shown considering the opposite counteracted
biases,25 65 66 for example, a consider-the-opposite
strategy led to less biased judgements of personality
traits67
Consider the control Causal claims are often made without an appropriate
control group67
▸ No published examples
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described above would be integral to this initiative: a
knowledge and understanding of reasoning and decision-
making theories, of cognitive and affective biases, of
logical fallacies and of standards for clarity, precision,
accuracy, relevance, logicalness, intellectual humility and
other attributes.80 The strategies described in this paper
can lead to an educational curriculum that brings the
traditional clinical adages into a coherent framework and
that engages students and residents with real case exam-
ples in which cognitive pitfalls and debiasing are show-
cased and studied.
4. Many decision makers in clinical practice appear to rec-
ognise at least some of their biases and put measures in
place to control them. However, the interface between
patient and doctor is unique and so dynamic that even
the best minds are challenged. Many contextual influ-
ences are difficult to control: the patient’s characteristics
and personality, the demographics and presentation
(both typical and atypical) of the disease process itself,
the knowledge, experience, expertise, personality and
other characteristics of the physician, and the ambient
conditions under which the decision will be made.
Cultural and other individual differences also play a role
in the effectiveness of debiasing initiatives.
5. Type 1 processing is essential to cognitive functioning
and generally serves us well; in fact we could not live
without it.81 82 Given that the vast majority of our daily
decisions involve Type 1 processes,83 there is consider-
able ground to be made in educating intuition.49 Better
environments can be created by providing better mentor-
ing and feedback, by having fewer insults to homeostasis
(more rest, sleep and reduced cognitive overloading) and
by having trainees learn their skills by making the scien-
tific method intuitive. Strategies to avoid extraneous
influences on decision making84 would also be
worthwhile.
Clinicians must be informed and recognise the need
for constant vigilance and surveillance of their think-
ing to mitigate diagnostic and other clinical errors.
There is an ongoing imperative to self-monitor for
bias and especially to be mindful of faulty decision
making at vulnerable times, and for the risk of exces-
sive reliance on intuitive judgements when further
reflection is required. This is captured in a current
definition of critical thinking: ‘the ability to engage in
purposeful, self-regulatory judgment’.85 This paper
has reviewed a rich variety of cognitive debiasing
initiatives from social science and clinical medicine.
Given recent advances in the understanding of clinical
decision making, the time appears ripe for renewed
research effort and we hope these two papers will
provoke such effort.
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